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UNNECESSARY AND UNINTELLIGIBLE 
Mark A. Graber* 
No constitution produced after much deliberation by rea-
sonably intelligent persons is likely to contain passages that are 
"stupid" in the sense of being "foolish; dull in intellect; nonsensi-
cal."! Many constitutional provisions quickly outlived their origi-
nal purpose (the electoral college)2 and others are venal (the not-
so oblique protections of slavery). Nevertheless, contemporary 
claims that some constitutional provision is plainly stupid proba-
bly overlook the sound reasons the framers had for inserting that 
particular language into the constitutional text. 
Still, if any provision in the constitution merits the appella-
tion "stupid," it is the conclusion of Article I, § 8, which states 
that "the congress shall have the Power ... To make all Laws 
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution 
the foregoing Powers." Understood literally, the clause prevents 
congress from exercising vital constitutional powers. More sig-
nificantly, the necessary and proper clause satisfies historical 
tests for stupidity: The framers did not seriously consider its 
meaning, and prominent defenders of the constitution subse-
quently confessed that the provision was unnecessary and 
unintelligible. 
The necessary and proper clause apparently establishes a 
constitutional standard that legislation rarely meets. No neces-
sary means exist in many cases for realizing certain purposes. 
There is, for example, no necessary way of leaving a room with 
two doors. Although many policies help further such govern-
ment goals as reducing poverty, promoting peace or preventing 
crime, no single legislative strategy seems the necessary means 
for achieving those ends. The phrase "necessary and proper" 
also obliterates the distinction between constitutionality and wis-
dom, a distinction central to the framer's goal of eliminating ba-
* Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Maryland. 
1. Webster's Scholastic Dictionary 355 (Airmount Pub. Co., 1966). 
2. Such provisions remain in the present constitution because they serve the inter-
est of a minority large enough to block a contrary amendment and not because Ameri-
cans lack the intelligence to perceive or the energy to repeal stupid constitutional clauses. 
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sic regime questions from normal political discourse.3 A 
measure that is unwise cannot be a necessary means for achiev-
ing some important constitutional purpose. Hence, a literal read-
ing of the necessary and proper clause suggests imprudent 
measures must be unconstitutional. 
Better would have been emulation of the Massachusetts 
constitution and its authorization of "wholesome and reasonable 
orders, laws, statutes, and ordinances."4 No one besides John 
Marshall and Alexander Hamilton, however, seriously contends 
that "necessary ... means no more than needful, requisite, inci-
dental, useful or condusive to,''s even if one rejects the Jefferso-
nian argument that "necessary means" are "those means without 
which the grant of power would be nugatory."6 Unfortunately, 
no one, including the constitutional framers, knows the point of 
the phrase "necessary and proper." 
The records of the Constitutional Convention provide no 
help. The Committee on Detail gave no hint why it chose the 
language it did, and the Convention in tum apparently perceived 
these particular alterations to prior drafts as merely stylistic, ac-
cepting the Committee's handiwork without debate or what a 
modem analyst might term "republican deliberation. "1 At the 
least, this suggests that the delegates were unaware of the capac-
ity for controversy contained within the Clause. 
Delegates who thought the phrase "necessary and proper" 
would clearly demonstrate that Congress did not have an unlim-
ited authority to pass laws were quickly disabused of that foolish 
notion by anti-Federalist commentators. Leading opponents of 
the Constitution immediately pointed out that as long as Con-
gress retained the power to determine what laws were "necessary 
and proper," the Clause would not in practice limit congressional 
3. See Jeffrey K. Thlis, The Rhetoricol Presidency 30-32 (Princeton U. Press, 1987). 
4. Constitution of Massachusetts-1780, Wtlliam F. Swindler, ed., 5 Sources and 
Documents of U.S. Constitutions fJ7 (Oceana Publications, Inc., 1975). 
5. Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bank, February 23, 
1791, in Jacob E. Cooke, ed., The Reports of Alexander Hamilton 88 (Harper & Row, 
1964). See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316,413 (1819). See also, Wtlliam 
Wtnslow Crosskey, 1 Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United StllleS 392-93 
(Chicago U. Press, 1953) (suggesting that the "necessary and proper" clause recognized 
that the federal government had broad power to legislate for the general welfare). 
6. Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionolity of a National Bank in Merrill 
D. Peterson, ed., The Portable Thomas Jefferson 265 (Penguin, 1975). 
7. The convention did quickly vote down as "unnecessary" Madison's proposal to 
insert "and establish all offices" between "laws" and "necessary." Farrand II, p. 345. No 
one, however, considered whether the phrase "necessary and proper" or the entire clause 
was also unnecessary. 
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discretion in any way.s "Necessary and proper" was a stunningly 
poor candidate for guiding legislative judgment, Brutus pointed 
out, because it is "utterly impossible fully to define this power."9 
At the least the ambiguity of the Clause belies the founding gen-
eration's belief that written constitutions would require "no 
sophistry; no construction; no false glosses, but simple inferences 
from the obvious operation of things."to 
Constitutional defenders proved unable to respond to these 
anti-Federalist criticisms. When Hamilton claimed that "the na-
tional government" would be the "judge of the necessity and pro-
priety of the laws to be passed for executing the powers of the 
Union,"u he was repeating rather than responding to anti-Feder-
alist attacks. More generally, the authors of The Federalist Pa-
pers attempted to defuse controversy over "necessary and 
proper" by claiming that the clause was an "unfortunate and ca-
lumniated provision" or superfluous.tz Hamilton "affirmed with 
perfect confidence that the constitutional operation of the in-
tended government would be precisely the same if these clauses 
were entirely obliterated."t3 "Had the Constitution been silent 
on this head," James Madison wrote, "there can be no doubt that 
all the particular powers requisite as means of executing the gen-
eral powers would have resulted to the government by unavoida-
ble implication."t4 
McCulloch v. Maryland apparently neutered the framer's 
misfeasance by reading the necessary and proper clause out of 
the constitution. The phrase "necessary and proper," however, 
still haunts constitutional theory from its perch in interpretive 
limbo. McCulloch is typically one of the first major cases of con-
8. See Letters of Centinel, in Herbert Storing, ed., 2 The Complete Anti-Federalist 
177 (Chicago U. Press, 1981); Essays of Brutus, in Herbert Storing, ed., 2 The Complete 
Anti-Federalist 365, 389-91, 421 (Chicago U. Press, 1981); An Old Whig, in Herbert Stor-
ing, 3 The Complete Anti-Federalist 24 (Chicago U. Press, 1981); Address by Sydney, in 
Herbert Storing, ed., 6 The Complete Anti-Federalist 113 (Chicago U. Press, 1981); A 
Countryman, in Herbert Storing, ed., 6 The Complete Anti-Federalist 86 (Chicago U. 
Press, 1981). 
9. Essays of Brutus at 390 (cited in note 8). See Essays of Brutus at 421 (cited in 
note 8); An Old Whig at 24 (cited in note 8); Letters from The Federal Farmer, Herbert 
Storing, ed., 2 The Complete Anti-Federalist 247 (Chicago U. Press, 1981). 
10. Jonathan Elliott, ed., 2 The Debates in the Several States on the Adoption of the 
Federal Constitution as Recommended by the General Convention at Philadelphia in 1787 
285 (Philadelphia, 1836) (quoting John Jay). See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Un-
derstanding of Original Intent, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 885, 902-13 (1985). 
11. Hamilton, Alexander, Madison, James, and Jay, John, The Federalist Papers 203 
(New American Library, 1961). 
12. Id. at 202. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. at 285. 
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stitutional interpretation that law students read. In constitutional 
English, they learn, "necessary" does not mean necessary. This 
lesson prepares students to accept without question that in con-
stitutional English "no law" does not have to mean no law, that 
"interstate commerce" may simply mean commerce and that 
"due process" may somehow encompass a right to an abortion. 
By accepting these interpretive sleights of hand from the very 
beginning most law students and professors never find the occa-
sion to ask why, when resolving basic questions of social justice 
and institutional structure, Americans should "interpret" a con-
stitution that may contain stupid, outdated or venal passages in-
stead of simply making what in their opinion are the wisest 
political choices. 
